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Introduction 
Social science emerged as a form of reflection on the fundamental transformations 
that shaped the societal institutions later regarded as characteristic of the modern 
world, of modernity. This image was part and parcel of the self-consciousness of 
the generation of scholars that - following Talcott Parsons' monumental rewrit-
ing of the history of social science in the mid-1930's1 - we have come to think 
of as the "classical" social scientists': Weber's, Durkheim's and Pareto's. It has 
been equally typical of social scientists ever since. 
     Scholars as different as Eric Hobsbawm, Talcott Parsons, and Reinhard 
Bendix2 capture these transformations in terms of a "dual revolution" in, on the 
one hand, industrial and technological practices and, on the other, the political 
practices inherent in the French revolution and the ensuing waves of democratic 
demands which had repercussions throughout the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. However these technological, economic, and political transformations 
were parallelled and partly underpinned by transformations in intellectual and 
cultural practices and in the institutions which served as vehicles for such prac-
tices. 
     These intellectual transformations have been taken up in a range of studies 
of individual disciplines or proto-disciplines, of individual intellectual environ-
ments - be they the Edinburgh of the late Scottish Enlightenment (e.g., in stu-
dies by Nicholas Phillipson) or the Gottingen of German Enlightenment (e.g., in 
studies by Peter Hanns Reill). Thus the powerful imagery of Roy Porter and 
G.S. Rousseau, when they described the eighteenth century, is no longer entirely 
valid. Historians of science no longer see this period "as a tiresome trough to be 
negotiated between the peaks of the seventeenth and those of the nineteenth cen-
tury; or as a mystery, a twilight zone in which all is on the verge of yielding." 3
1 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, New York, The Free Press, 1937. 
2 Reinhard Bendix "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", Comparative Studies in Society and His-
   tory, vol.9, 1967, pp.292-346. 
3 G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds.), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of 
  Eighteenth Century Science, Cambridge, Cambridge Uuiversity Press, 1980. 
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     Thus in a volume on Romanticism and the Sciences published some years 
ago, two prominent scholars, Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, argue 
that "(t)wo `Scientific Revolutions' are now commonly recognized - a first 
revolution around the turn of the sixteenth century, in which new mathematical-
ly and experimentally oriented branches of natural philosophy were created, and 
a second revolution around the turn of the eighteenth century, in which was 
formed the federation of disciplines we call `science'. Science, in our sense, once 
held to be more than two thousand years old, is now credited with less than two 
hundred years of history." 4 
     However, yet, but for a number of relatively isolated case studies, the self-
understanding of the social and human sciences by no means recognizes any such 
conceptual and epistemic revolution coterminous with the formation of the poli-
tical and technological practices that we have come to associate with the world of 
modernity. But for the heroic scholarly programs of Foucault and Koselleck -
that will be discussed both in this essay - few if any attempts have been under-
taken to carefully combine the insights from available sources and studies and ex-
amine the range and depth of the great intellectual transformation that in many 
ways seems to have shaped the most fundamental categories and assumptions that 
came to dominate discourse in the social and human sciences ever since. 
     This relative neglect is even more striking considering the fact that in so-
cial and political theory today, social knowledge is not only regarded as a form 
of reflection on the secular transformations that have shaped modern institutions. 
Social knowledge is also seen as essential for the very constitution of these in-
stitutions. This is, to take but one prominent example, what Anthony Giddens 
is referring to when he argues that "the social sciences play a basic role in the re-
flexivity of modernity." `Institutional reflexivity' in the sense of the regularized 
use of knowledge about the circumstances of social life is indeed a constitutive 
element of the institutional practices of modernity itself.5
     These key institutions of modernity - archetypically exemplified by a 
liberal market economy rather than a regulated mercantilist economy, by a mod-
ern nation state and a constitutionally limited polity rather than an absolutistic 
police state and by modern scientific discourses and a research-oriented university 
- all emerged in the wake of the deep-seated economic , political and discursive 
transformations of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The evolu-
tion of these institutional projects in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
4 Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (eds.), Romanticism and the Sciences, Cambridge, Cam-
  bridge University Press, 1990, p.1. 
5 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, pp. 14ff.
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centuries was a highly uneven process and the turn of the nineteenth century in 
many ways marked a profound crisis of modernity. A liberal economy was no 
longer - in the wake of the long depression from the mid-1870's to the mid-
1890's - seen to guarantee wealth and growth, a liberal nation state no longer 
peace and freedom. Weber's image of humankind being threatened by the iron 
cage of an inevitably advancing bureaucracy is but one amongst many examples. 
Evidently, modern science was no longer able to yield a cognitively meaningful 
map of the fragmented life of modern urban, mass society: what Nietzsche, Kaf-
ka and Bergson had expressed in literary and philosophical terms was echoed by 
countless writers analyzing the anomie and rootlessness of modernity, discarding 
the search for knowledge and eulogizing aesthetic experience and the display of 
the power of will. In fact the writings during this "first crisis of modernity" -
pace Peter Wagner6 - prominently carried some key themes that have recurred 
in present-day postmodernist theorizing. 
      Thus our very understanding of the formation of the societies of moderni-
ty will have to involve a sustained effort to analyze the emergence and evolution 
of societal order relative to discourses and to various social-scientific projects that 
have helped underpin (but also undermine) prominent modes of institutional re-
flexivity. Such reflexivity is relevant not only for the constitution of societal 
order and its institutional practices but also for its span of policy options. At key 
junctures the range of such options may be critically premised on discourses on 
society, indeed on social science itself.7 
     Already initially, it should be stated that the term discourse, extensively 
used in this essay, should not be read to entail a far-reaching subscription to 
some particular linguistic theory. Rather the term is simply used in the broad 
sense as its established usage in studies of the history of political reasoning and in 
historical accounts of the social sciences themselves.8 This usage does, however, 
entail some important methodological commitments. 
      Thus the notion of discourse points to both the intellectual and the social
6 Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline, London, Routledge, 1994. 
7 A number of the contributions to Douglas E. Ashford (ed.) History and Context in Comparative Public 
  Policy, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, as well as to Theda Skocpol and Dietrich 
  Rueschemeyer (eds.), States, knowledge and the Origins of Social Policies, Princeton, Princeton Uni-
  versity Press, 1996, effectively illustrate this feature of modern polities. See also Peter Wagner et al 
  (eds.), Social Sciences and Modern States, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, and Peter 
  Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock and Richard Whitley (eds.), Discourses on Society: The Shaping of the Social 
  Science Disciplines, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. 
8 This is for instance the case in Dorothy Ross' volume on The Origins of American Social Science, 
  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, or in Anthony Pagden's (ed.), The Languages of Poli-
   tical Theory in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, or in James Tul-
  ly's (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, Princeton, 
  Princeton University Press, 1988. 
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nature of beliefs, and it does not, as, say, `idiom' or `vocabulary' or for that mat-
ter `metaphor' do, exclusively focus on the purely linguistic properties, nor sug-
gest that the cognitive and intellectual component is not really worth taking all 
that seriously anyway. Discourse is then not just information, it is social and re-
ciprocal, and it is not just any odd monologue but requires of its propounders an 
ability to reason, to provide justification and argumentation but in a setting 
which has an element of reflexivity. Thus the concepts and ideas proposed in 
discourse draw upon notions in society but may also deeply affect and feed into 
day-to-day interaction in society. 
     Maybe, it is precisely because some of the key assumptions of social and 
institutional practices are now once again open for doubt and critical scrutiny -
be they assumptions about the nature of human agency, about modes of consti-
tuting societal interests, about implications of a separation of empirical and moral 
discourses, or the basis for delimiting a civil society from the polity proper -
that gradually social scientists and historians alike seem increasingly willing to 
move beyond the panoply of individual case studies and outline the contours of a 
deep-seated transformation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
that came to affect all of the social sciences as well as their relationship to the 
humanities and the natural sciences.9 
     This essay will first outline the contours of an analysis of the epistemic 
and institutional rupture at the formative moment of modernity in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries. In particular, it will try to highlight the 
formative relevance of this transformation for the social sciences as we have come 
to know them. This focus provides an illustration of the relevance of historical 
reasoning for a revised self-understanding of the social sciences and for a need of 
taking the calls for reflexivity in the social and human sciences more seriously 
than is customarily the case. 
     Secondly, the essay will focus on the implications of the so-called lin-
9 For the interplay of these intellectual cultures see Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: the 
  Rise of Sociology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Peter Dear (ed.), The Literary 
  Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
  1991; I. Bernard Cohen (ed.), The Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences: Critical and Historical 
  Perspectives, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994; Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert 
   Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains. Berkeley, Universityof Cali-
  fornia Press. 1995; "Origins of the Human Sciences", special issue of History of the Human Sciences, 
  6, 1993. Richard Olson's The Emergence of the Social Sciences, 1642-1792, New York, Twayne Pub-
  lishers, 1993, provides the most recent general overview but is more problematic. It is characterized by 
   a rather one-sided focus on the natural sciences that serve as models and exemplars rather than being 
  seen in a process of interaction with the discourses on society. More seriously, it seems to have taken 
  little or no account of the insights that both the Cambridge historians and scholars in the tradition of 
  Begriffsgeschichte have so amply demonstrated, namely that for any historical reconstruction of the so-
  cial and human sciences that wishes to avoid a Whig interpretation a necessary strategy is to carefully 
  guard against the usage of anachronistic terminology and conceptual schemes.
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guistic turn for such an effort to rethink the social sciences as historically 
grounded discourses of modernity. In turn, the relevance for historical self-
understanding of the social sciences of three research programs in intellectual his-
tory will be discussed, namely those of genealogical structuralism, conceptual his-
tory and linguistic contextualism. 
     Thirdly, three main social science approaches to the reintroduction of his-
torical reasoning in the modern social sciences will be briefly examined, none of 
which incidentally seems to take the reflexivity of the social sciences or recent 
advances in intellectual history sufficiently into account. 
     In a concluding section of the essay, elements will be outlined of a prog-
ram to bring intellectual and institutional historical reasoning back into the core 
of theorizing about major social transformations. One key element in such a 
program is constituted by an analysis of the historically close links between social 
theory itself and social transformations, i.e., the theme that is illustrated already 
in the first section of the essay.
Epistemic Shifts, Institutional Transformations and the Forma-
tion of Modernity 
In the last two decades there has been a profound shift of emphasis in how social 
science theorizes about societal institutions. This shift has sometimes been la-
belled the linguistic turn, and has basically been premised on a realization that an 
understanding of social and political life will ultimately have to depend on an 
understanding of what has actually prompted human beings to act or not to act, 
what has made the world meaningful and intelligible to them, what has consti-
tuted their identity and what courses of action have appeared feasible and legiti-
mate. Jointly these developments have meant that classical problems of language, 
meaning and discourse central to conceptions and notions of society in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries have once again come to the forefront of the 
theoretical dialogue. 
      Clearly there are various ways to characterize and interpret this "great 
transition," as Steven Turner has called it,10 just as there are different strategies 
for its explanation. A preliminary characteristic of the whole process was the 
trend towards a more differentiated constellation of intellectual practices. This 
tendency is indicated, among others, by the fact that a common vocabulary, that 
had previously centered around such terms as "nature" and "reason," lost much 
of its appeal. Instead, a disciplinary orientation came to dominate most fields of 
10 R. Steven Turner, "The Great Transition and the Social Patterns of German Science", Minerva, 25, 
    1987, pp.56-76. 
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inquiry. "Natural philosophy" gave way to "physics," "chemistry," and "biolo-
gy," and something similar occurred with "moral philosophy," which was gra-
dually replaced by a new structure involving anthropology, economics, political 
science, sociology and the like. Even the most general intellectual specialties, like 
theology and philosophy, tended to become separate disciplines." 
     This pattern of differentiation corresponded closely to institutional 
changes. The center for intellectual work shifted from academies and other 
learned societies to reformed universities and newly created professional schools 
and research centers.12 In the reformed universities or grandes ecoles, as in 
France, scholarly work became a disciplinary endeavor, more or less clearly dis-
tinguishable from other disciplines as well as from amateur activities. Scientific 
training, research, publication and professional organization, now all tended to be 
organized primarily along disciplinary lines. Modes of presentation and historical 
accounts changed in a corresponding way. In encyclopedias scientific fields took 
a standard form: a definite historical introduction, a statement of the methodo-
logical principles of the discipline, claims about the specific domain of the subject 
and a defense of its boundaries, and celebration of the heroes of the subject and 
their part in making it a modern science.13 
     The emergence of the social sciences as a relatively distinct intellectual field 
was itself an important feature of this process of intellectual and institutional dif-
ferentiation. Here again the terms indicate a double process. There was, on the 
one hand, a marked shift from such general frameworks as "natural law" and 
"moral philosophy" to more specific, and often more "scientific" ones (econo-
mics, anthropology, social mathematics, etc.). At the same time, new terms 
emerged as general denominator for these discourses: "moral and political scien-
ce" and somewhat later "social science." The expression "moral and political sci-
ence" came into use in France during the 1760's, probably in the circle of the 
physiocrats. The term "social science" was coined in the 1790's in the circle 
around Condorcet. It subsequently spread to England and Scotland, and then to
11 One of the most extensive studies on discipline formation is Rudolf Stichweh, Zur Entstehung des 
   modernen Systems wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen: Physik in Deutschland 1746-1890, Frankfurt am 
   Main, 1984. For the changing role of philosophy see Randall Collins, "A Micro-Macro Theory of 
   Intellectual Creativity: the Case of German Idealist Philosophy", Sociological Theory, 5, 1987, pp.47-
   69; Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1979, pp.133-
  139. 
12 For a comparative account of these institutional changes see Bjorn Wittrock, "The Modern University: 
   the Three Transformations," in Sheldon Rothblatt and Bjorn Wittrock (eds.), The European and 
   American University Since 1800: Historical and Sociological Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
   ty Press, 1993, pp.303-362. 
13 Richard Yeo, "Reading Encyclopedias. Science and the Organization of Knowledge in British Dic-
   tionaries of Arts and Sciences, 1730-1850," Isis, 82, 1991, pp.24-49. 
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the German speaking countries.14 The introduction of these new denominations 
was accompanied or followed by institutional projects (journals, societies), 
which, in France, culminated in the establishment of a separate "Class" for the 
Moral and Political Sciences at the newly founded Institut de France (1795), 
which replaced the former academies. The natural sciences formed the first class 
of the Institut, the social sciences the second, and literature and the fine arts the 
third and last class. The French national institute thus perfectly exemplified Wolf 
Lepenies' description of the modern intellectual world as a constellation of "three 
cultures. " 
     The class for the moral and political sciences was itself divided in different 
sections (philosophy, morals, law, history, political economy, geography), all of 
which played an important role in the shaping of these disciplines in France. 
During the Napoleonic period the "second class" was abolished, but it was resur-
rected after the Restoration as Academic des sciences morales et politiques (1832), 
which remained the official center for French social science until at least the end 
of the nineteenth century, when university disciplines successfully challenged the 
monopoly of the Academy. 
     The French development is a particularly clear case, but the emergence of 
modern social sciences during these years from 1750 to 1850 is also evident in 
other countries. Whereas the institutionalization of disciplinary social science is 
generally of a somewhat later date,15 many of the central assumptions, terms and 
concepts were shaped in these years from Enlightenment to Romanticism. In the 
French case, as has been argued by e.g., Eric Brian, the momentous intellectual 
transformation of the old moral and political sciences into what became towards 
the end of the nineteenth century the institutionalization of academic social scien-
ces can only be understood, Brian argues, against the backdrop of the extraordin-
ary conjunction of intellectual, institutional and macro-societal events in the 
1770's and 1780's in France. 
     Another historian of science, Ian Hacking, has coined the felicitous ex-
pression "avalanche of printed numbers" to capture the 300,000 fold increase in 
the very scale of public counting that occurred in the nineteenth century after 
1820. This development entailed a decisive shift from the old political arithmetic 
to social statistics. The basic premise of counting shifted away from just a con-
cern for the riches of an absolutistic ruler - or for that matter, as in the case of 
14 Brian Head, "The Origins of, ̀ la science sociale' in France, 1770-1800," Australian Journal of French 
    Studies, 19, 1982, pp.115-132. For the development of Enlightenment social theory to Comtean 
   sociology, see Johan Heilbron, The Rise of Social Theory, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. 
15 Cf. Peter Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock, Richard Whitley (eds.), Discourses on Society. The Shaping of 
   the Social Science Disciplines (Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook XV), Dordrecht/Boston, 1991. 
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Petty's famous survey of Ireland, an inventory of the spoils of a victorious con-
quering power. Brian discusses this same process in its very inception in terms of 
- following the works of Robert Descimon and Alain Guery but also of his old 
teacher Pierre Bourdieu - a process of "the autonomisation of the State from the 
absolute monarchy." 
     The new social statistics of the nineteenth century provided information 
about society, even those aspects of society - say, the numbers and methods of 
suicides in different districts - that in no obvious way were within the easy 
reach of a ruler. Clearly, this does not entail that statistics had become unrelated 
to political concerns but rather that a new conception of society and population 
in terms of system, systemic properties and regularities of aggregate numbers 
was emerging and came to form the foundation for public interventions. Thus a 
view of the social universe emerges which focuses less on individual peculiarities 
and particular actions and more on representing and comparing groups in aggre-
gate terms. The techniques that enable such representations to be made in an 
accurate way are, as emphasized e.g., by Michael Donnely, techniques that lead 
to "a new mode to act upon" by "making the world thinkable for. statistics." 
"Savoir" and "pouvoir" came, it might be argued, to be even more closely linked 
because of this shift from a more narrowly political to a more broadly conceived 
social science. 
     Social theorists, not least Peter Wagner, have highlighted important con-
sequences of the deep-seated transition from the moral sciences and from political 
philosophy to empirical sciences. This shift in the order of knowledge, its 
themes and foci of discourse was, as already emphasized, intimately linked to the 
revolutionary upheavals in France and America. 
     In a situation of a radically expanding realm of possible human action -
and a concomitant awareness of the contingency not just of human existence in 
general beyond the old certainties of the life experiences of given locales and 
positions in social hierarchies but of the conditions of living together, forming 
new collective identities and political orders - there is a dramatically growing 
need to understand the pre-political givens and structures of human existence as 
well as the structural conditions and consequences of a newly created polity itself. 
     Thus social science, in Wagner's reading, becomes a kind of empirical 
political philosophy that transcends and replaces the old genres of political phi-
losophy, moral sciences but also of the cameralistic administrative sciences of an 
earlier political order - what not only liberals but also Marx regarded as "the 
miserable cameral sciences." The social sciences are the discourses of modernity, 
a modernity that is fundamentally characterized by the duality of liberty and dis-
cipline, contingency and stability, certainty and order. 
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     An important element, Wagner and others argue, of the development of 
these discourses of modernity is the unfolding of different epistemic stances of 
two main strategies for rediscovering certainties in an age of modernity, namely 
systematic observation as opposed to reflective conceptualization. These episte-
mic strategies tended to be linked to different - the early Habermas would have 
called them Erkenntnisinteressen - key interests. These interests in turn tend 
to give rise to research styles later associated with terms such as behaviorism and 
a broad historical and comparative sociological reasoning. Neither tradition, 
however, could be easily contained within the discursive framework of classical 
political philosophy. Rather they would on the one hand go beyond its realm, 
on the other hand leave unexplored some of the key philosophical and moral 
questions that had formed the main foci of earlier political philosophy. 
      In the late nineteenth century - that is an argument pursued at some 
length by some of several scholars in recent times16 - the multitude of explora-
tions of society - that is performed within the framework of a plethora of 
societies, associations, academic settings and different commissions - becomes, 
partially and unevenly, institutionalized in academic settings in the form of a 
small number of academic disciplines that permit the reproduction of certain dis-
courses on society but also radically constrain the range of intellectually legiti-
mate inquiry. Largely this process of reduction and disciplinary institutionaliza-
tion has a twofold backdrop. 
      Firstly, the research oriented university that was created and resurrected 
in rudimentary fashion in the early nineteenth century, had by the end of the cen-
tury become the archetypical institution for the generation and transmission of 
advanced knowledge.17 Secondly, the apparently natural ordering of the cogni-
tive universe of the social sciences in the process of their academic institutiona-
lization closely correspond to a more or less tacit assumption in much late 
nineteenth century political thinking, namely that there is a "natural" tri-partite 
divisioning between the economic activities of the market, the political ones of 
the state and an aggregate of social relations of "society." 18 
     This tri-partite division - which was becoming increasingly problematic 
even in terms of state activities in the nineteenth century - came to give rise to
16 For instance in Peter Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock and Richard Whitley (eds.), Discourses on Society: The 
   Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; Peter 
   Wagner, Carol Weiss, Bjorn Wittrock and Hellmut Wollmann (eds.), Social Sciences and Modern 
   States, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
17 This process is examined in some detail in Rothblatt and Wittrock (eds.), op.cit (see note 5 above). 
18 For an interesting recent comment along similar lines see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Open the Social Sci-
   ences", Items, Vol 50, No 1, March 1996, pp.1-7. See also Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social 
   Science: The Limits of Nineteen th-Century Paradigms, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991. 
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the differentiation of the social science disciplines, firstly - and largely for insti-
tutional and professional reasons - in the American context, and only belatedly 
during the twentieth century in the European context as well. 
     One of the reasons why the great transition to modernity in the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries calls for our attention might, as already 
argued, be that once again we might be forced to raise the same kind of fun-
damental question that were then examined and given answers that have come to 
impinge upon our own understanding of the whole age of modernity. A minimal 
hope might be, to use Peter Wagner's terminology, that "scholars remain some-
what able to grasp the reigning mode of selectivity and to keep some reflexive 
distance to the intellectual project even while pursuing it." 
     Even in this late twentieth century call for a minimalist critical philosophy, 
there is an echo of that revolution in philosophy two hundred years ago that was 
one of the crucial intellectual events in the formative moment of the discourses of 
modernity. 
      We may summarize the previous argument by stating that there is need 
for a fundamental revision of a long-standing and predominant view among so-
cial scientists and humanists as well as in lay debates about the formation of 
modernity in terms of a conjunction of a technological and a political transforma-
tion, the industrial and the democratic revolutions respectively. This traditional 
interpretation radically underestimates the deep-seated epistemic transformation 
that occurs at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Despite all 
continuities and long-term processes of gestation, a range of recent studies suggest 
that there is indeed a great transition in epistemic and institutional terms at this 
juncture. This transition also signals a call for a radically revised self-understand-
ing among social scientist of the history of their own disciplines. It is simply not 
enough to waver between a focus on the sixteenth and seventeenth century early 
political philosophers and legal scholars on the one hand and the "classics" of so-
cial science in the period of its academic and disciplinary institutionalization on 
the other. Rather there are reasons to carefully examine the ways in which dis-
tinctively modern key concepts of an understanding of society emerge during the 
great transition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
     One such shift pertains precisely to the concepts of society and history and 
to the new awareness of the structural and constraining nature of societal life 
beyond the domain of the communicative interactions in the political sphere 
proper. Thus there is a transition to a social science that transcends the bound-
aries of the political sphere proper but also traces the implications and conditions 
of that sphere much further than the old political philosophy. Pierre Manent has 
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put forward the notion that society is a "postrevolutionary discovery". True 
enough, and as convincingly demonstrated by Keith Baker, the term society 
undergoes a long conceptual development in the French context in the course of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century - with a dramatic increase in the utiliza-
tion of the term in the mid eighteenth century." It is also true that in his criti-
que of the Louis Dumont's analysis of Western individualism and holism, Marcel 
Gauchet argued - this is Baker's elegant summary - that: 
     "individualism was not simply a symptom of the dissolution of the prima-
cy of the social whole as that had been understood in traditional religious terms. 
It was also a necessary condition for what he once again called (following Karl 
Polanyi) the `discovery of society' - its discovery in strictly sociological terms, 
disengaged from the religious representations in which it had hitherto expressed 
its existence. Not until the ideological primacy of individual interests was post-
ulated, he argued, could constraints upon these interests be discovered in the op-
eration of an autonomous social order subject to its own laws." 20 
     Johan Heilbrone has pursued an inquiry in the constitution of individual 
interests and the various ways in which they, in the course of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, were conceived as amenable to the constraints of various 
notions of sociability and the socially acceptable outcomes of the pursuit of the 
self interests of human beings doomed to an existence short of true religious vir-
tue but at least with a prospect for a human existence beyond the borders of a 
Leviathan like imposition of absolute order. However, Heilbron and many 
others to-day, would agree that even if there is a long process of gestation of the 
modern concept of society, the unique event of Revolutionary upheaval entails 
that discursive controversy and poetical practice become joined in the formation 
of a distinctly modern era. Pierre Menant has elaborated a similar argument: 
      "After the Revolution
, the men of the nineteenth century no longer lived 
merely in civil society or the state, they lived in a third element that received va-
rious names, usually `society' or `history'. Regardless of what it was called, this 
element had the greatest authority. This `society' then was more than and diffe-
rent from `civil society': the latter had been created by the totality of relationships 
spontaneously formed by men, transformed by the desire for preservation, while 
the former had no explicit natural foundation. Its authority did not lie in `na-
ture,' but in `history', in the historical evolution." 21
19 Keith Michael Baker, "Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History", 
   in Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (eds.), Main Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays, Amster-
   dam, Rodopi, 1994, pp.95-120. 
20 Ibid, p.112. 
21 Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 
   1994, p.81.
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      True enough, Manent admits, an author such as Montesquieu granted 
more authority than any other 18th century author to history understood as the 
development of "knowledge" and "commerce". However, whereas he wanted to 
establish the authority of history, he "did not feel it ...It is definitely from the Re-
volution that this feeling dates. More precisely, it derives from the fact that the 
Revolution failed to develop adequate political institutions... The Revolution 
offered the original spectacle of a political change of unheard-of-scope, yet having 
no stable political effects, of a political upheaval of impossible to settle, of an in-
terminable and indeterminate event." 
     This description of the Revolution as an irreversible and interminable pro-
cess of fundamental change was formulated perhaps most clearly by one of the 
most well-known thinkers of the nineteenth century, namely Alexis de Toc-
queville. Thus in his memoirs, Souvenirs, written in the summer of 1850, i.e., 
two decades after the journey to New World that made him famous to posterity , 
he describes the revolution as one long upheaval "that our fathers have seen the 
beginning of and which, in all likelihood, we shall not see the end of. Every-
thing that remained of the old regime was destroyed for ever. 1122 
     In fact, Koselleck's conception in his early work Kritik and Krise is quite 
similar. He also links the temporal duration of the process of upheaval to its 
spatial, and indeed world wide, extension, as well as to its increasing intensity in 
terms of modernity as a process that affects all human beings, not just, say, those 
in central political institutions or certain major cities: 
     "Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert ist der Vorraum des gegenwartigen Zeital-
ters, dessen Spannungen sich seit der Franzosischen Revolution zunehmend vers-
charft hat, indem der revolutionare Prozess extensiv die ganze Welt and intensiv 
alle Menschen ergriff. " 23
      However it is also this sense of openness and contingency that serves as a 
forceful impetus to an examination of the structural conditions of the political 
body and entails a passage from political and moral philosophy to a social science. 
     This transition entails that five key problematiques - that to-day are more 
acutely open to reinterpretation than they have been for decades if not for a cen-
tury - are being formulated or at least fundamentally reformulated and enter 
into the new social science discourse.
     Firstly, the whole role of historical inquiry becomes a crucial one. 
22 Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres Completes, Tome XII, Souvenirs, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p.30. 
23 Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik and Krise. Ein Beitrag zur Pathogenese der burgerlichen 
   Freiburg/Miinchen, Verlag Karl Alber, 1959, p.2. 
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the one hand, historical reasoning becomes an integral part of the intellectual 
transition and even abstract reason itself becomes historicized in early nineteenth 
century philosophy. However, on the other hand, the break up of the moral and 
political sciences into a variety of new discourses that in the course of the 
nineteenth century coalesce and are reduced to a small number of disciplines also 
means that the stage is set for the divergence between a professionalized historical 
discipline and the other social and human sciences that we still today experience 
as a major intellectual divide.
     Secondly, interest in language and linguistic analysis enter into all do-
mains of the human and social sciences as a key problematique. One outflow of 
this is the constitution of textual and hermeneutic modes of analysis. A second 
one, familiar from contemporary debates on linguistic analysis and poststuctural-
ism, is that of the relationship between text, interpretation and consciousness.24 
A third one is the effort to historicize language and linguistic development itself 
Thereby a crucial link was provided to various collective entities such as the his-
tories construction of notion of different peoples.25
     This leads on to a third problematique, namely that of constituting new 
collective identities. If membership in a collectivity can no longer be taken for 
granted in terms of the life experiences of the inhabitants of a certain village or 
region or in terms of a relationship of rule between the princely ruler and his 
subjects, then even the most basic categories of societal existence are open to 
doubt. 
     In the late eighteenth century, categories such as ruler and subject are by 
no means irreversibly superseded - in fact they linger on in the imperial-like 
political entities in and at the borders of Europe for more than a century - but 
they are opened to doubt and in the aftermath of the French Revolution to the 
necessity of reconstitution. Categories such as citizen and compatriot capture 
some of the results of these processes of reconstitution. Robert Wokler, perhaps 
more clearly than anyone else, has issued a strong warning against any hasty 
equivocation of the French revolutionary notion of a nation state with a commit-
ment to a truly universal conception of rights of human beings.26
24 For an analysis of Schleiermacher in this respect see Thomas Pfau, "Immediacy and Text: Friedrich 
   Schleiermacher's Theory of Style and Interpretation" Journal of the History of Ideas, 1990, pp. 51-73. 
25 For a recent enjoyable overview of some of the lingering effects of these debates on language and peo-
   ple for the constitution of a sense of Englishness - and for the longstanding influence of the competi-
   tive German and Danish early nineteenth century scholars Grimm and Rask - see the review article. 
26 The recent special issue, edited by John Dunn, of Political Studies, Vol.42, 1994, is exemplary in its 
   historical sensitivity to the theme of "Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?" 
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     The parallel developments in Germany and many other parts of Europe to 
link the constitution of collective identities up to a historically constituted collec-
tivity such as that of a linguistic group or some other cultural entity only serve to 
further underscore Wokler's point in this respect and to warn against an all too 
easy and prevalent - among the self-proclaimed defenders and detractors of 
modernity alike - to identify the political and epistemic order of modernity with 
that of just an extension the Enlightenment project into political reality. 
     Fourthly, and as repeatedly emphasized, the whole problematique of the 
relationship between notions of polity, society and civil society were succinctly 
and acutely reformulated in this period of transition. The fact that once again 
this notions are probed and fundamentally reexamined should not conceal the fact 
that they were indeed in many ways not just reformulated in this period but 
rather discovered or even invented. 
     Fifthly, the most basic notion of any social and human science pertain to 
assumptions about what prompts human beings to act and how to interpret their 
actions within a broader framework. Such assumptions are at the very core of 
any scholarly program in the social and human sciences. At the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the fundamental categories that we still by 
and large draw upon were elaborated and proposed. 
     Three or four such fundamental categorical conceptualizations were prop-
ounded. Each of them had correlate conceptualization of what "society" was 
constituted by. These categories might 
      (a) an economic-rationalistic one with a corresponding view of society 
as a form of compositional collective; 
     (b) a statistical-inductive one with a view of society as a systemic 
aggregate; 
      (c) a structural-constraining one with a view of society in terms of an 
organic totality; and 
     (d) a linguistic-interpretive one with a societal conceptualization in 
terms of an emergent totality. 
     The transition from a discourse on moral and political philosophy to a so-
cial science - analyzed by for example by Robert Wokler27 - in rudimentary 
form takes place already in the mid and late 1790's in France after the Revolution. 
27 Robert Wokler, "Saint-Simon and the Passage from Political to Social Science", in Anthony Pagden 
    (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
    Press, pp.325-338. 
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It entails a decisive shift from an agential - some would say voluntaristic -
view of society to one that emphasizes structural conditions. 
      To some extent, a similar shift occurs in economic reasoning away from a 
broad concern about moral and political agency towards one where in the course 
of the nineteenth century "average economic man" becomes cast in a web of 
structural properties and dynamic regularities rather than in a moral universe of 
individual action. 
     Maybe, the deep irony of this secular shift and of the rise of the social sci-
ences is that the methodological origins are to be found in the one context, the 
French, were during the revolutionary upheavals, the emphasis on agency and 
change were greater than had ever been than case anywhere before. The very 
concept of revolution is itself an example of a concept that is subjected to drastic 
conceptual change and it entails not only an effort to change a political regime 
but to build a new community and a new world from the very beginnings. It is 
in reaction to this that both radicals - such as Saint-Simon and Comte - and 
conservatives - not to speak of reactionaries as de Bonald and de Maistre -
came to emphasize a structuralist and anti-voluntaristic conception of society. 
     By contrast, despite the deep influence of the French events on philosophy 
and scholarship in Germany, the very absence of a revolutionary transformation 
in the German political context was coterminous with an intellectual transforma-
tion that dramatically emphasized precisely the agential capacities of human 
beings. In this intellectual environment, there emerged a nexus of philosophical 
commitments - nicely explored in several essays by e.g., Peter Hanns Reill and 
Randall Collins - that involved the elaboration of a linguistic-interpretive con-
ception of agency as opposed to a purely rationalistic-compositional one - that 
came to be predominant in economic reasoning - or a structural-aggregate one 
- that came to characterize sociological and statistical reasoning . 
     Thus fundamental categories of agency and society that came to be elabo-
rated and refined during much of the rest of the nineteenth and twentieth centur-
ies can be discerned in rudimentary form already during the great transition. So, 
however, can also some of the more or less tacit, more or less explicit features 
that came to affect these endeavours. 
     One such tacit but crucial feature concerns the abandonment of the truly 
universal heritage of the Enlightenment project in favour of forms of representa-
tion and endowment of rights based on territoriality or membership in a linguis-
tically and historically constituted and constructed community. Another feature 
concerns the curtailment, not to say abandonment of the earlier tradition of mor-
al discourse even within the different conceptualization of basic agential Denkfi-
guren were being elaborated. A third one has to do with the dual way in which
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historical reasoning came to be both embraced and exorcised - with a perma-
nent divide between history and the social sciences remaining up until to-day, a 
divide quite unknown to previous genres of discourse. 
      These three features entail a chasm between an overt commitment to uni-
versality and the inability to conceptualize political order in other than highly 
particularistic terms, a chasm between philosophical and moral discourse and 
modern social science, and even a chasm between history and the other social and 
human sciences. 
     Thus the shift in epistemic and institutional regimes that occurred at the 
turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not immediately usher in the 
set of disciplinary configuration in the social and human sciences that we now all 
too often tend to take for granted. This only occurred in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries - and then only in an uneven and partial process that 
did not become a universal pattern of ordering until well after World War II. 
However it did entail, in more or less rudimentary form, both the institutional 
for intellectual activities as well as the epistemic forms that became constitutive of 
the discourses on society in the age of modernity.
Intellectual History and Social Transformations: Three Models 
of Language and Power in Context 
For any research project with the ambition to shed new light on the formative 
years of modern social science at least three general models are relevant: one was 
proposed by Michel Foucault, another one other by the German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck. Finally, it is necessary to take into account the profoundly 
impressive contributions associated with that renaissance in intellectual history 
that is associated with the linguistic contextualism of Quentin Skinner and other 
Cambridge-based or -trained scholars. 
Foucault's archeology of the human sciences, as presented in Les mots et les 
choses (1966), depicted a transformation in the "episteme", or deep structure of 
knowledge. This episteme was considered to be a sort of "historical a priori", a 
discursive code common to all discourses in a given period of time of which the 
users were unconscious. Two epistemic transformations were analyzed by 
Foucault in some detail: one during the second quarter of the seventeenth cen-
tury, marking the transition from the Renaissance to the "classical" era; the other 
during the decades from 1775 to 1825, marking the transition from the classical 
to the modern episteme. Foucault based his study on three fields inquiry, show-
ing that the classical discourse on grammar, living creatures and wealth, was pro-
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foundly transformed around 1800 in a modern discourse on historical language, 
life and productive labour, which became the theoretical objects of philology, 
biology and economics. Foucault assumed that the observed regularities were 
valid for the episteme of the whole period and insisted on the discontinuity be-
tween the different epistemic codes. 
     Although Les mots et les choses is still a provocative and stimulating 
book, it has numerous flaws. Many problems of his analysis are the result of the 
structuralist mood in which it was conceived. Foucault not only eliminated the 
producers of these discourses from his analysis, he showed no interest in the 
actual process of discursive production, he ignored its social and political condi-
tions, and also refrained from asking the question as to how and why epistemic 
change occurs. While his work has provoked many debates, also among special-
ists in the history of biology or linguistics, his central proposition that man as a 
subject of science was invented only at the end of the eighteenth century has 
found little support. And Foucault's own research after Les mots et les choses 
went in a different direction.28
Koselleck's "Sattelzeit" and the German "Begriffsgeschichte" 
Another line of research has been outlined by Reinhart Koselleck. His work has 
been debated and used in a wide circle of German scholars, and has only recently 
drawn attention outside of the German speaking countries. In short, Koselleck 
argued that the decades around 1800 constituted, not so much a "break" in 
Foucault's sense, but a period of accelerated economic, social and political 
change. This period of transformation, a Sattelzeit, is both reflected in and 
shaped by processes of conceptual innovation, which are taken as the focus of the 
research. Koselleck's work therefore is a particular form of conceptual history, 
Begriffsgeschichte. 
     Having done earlier work on the Enlightenment and German social 
history,29 Koselleck, in 1967, published detailed instructions for a lexicon on 
changes in the political and social vocabulary. The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
28 The new direction was already indicated by his criticism of structural history and his rehabilitation of 
   the "event" in L'archeologie du savoir (1969). 
29 These two books, Kritik and Krise (1959) and Preussen zwischen Reform and Revolution (1967), 
   were both path-breaking studies, which were largely ignored outside of Germany for a long time. 
   Kritik and Krise was translated into French in 1979 and into English in 1988. Together with Haber-
   mas' Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (1962), translated into French and English in respectively 1979 
   and 1989, it gained an important role in the recent debate on the rise of a public sphere and the forma-
   tion of public opinion. See, for example, Anthony J. La Vopa, "Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Socie-
   ty in Eighteenth Century Europe", Journal of Modern History, 64, 1992, pp.79-116; Dena Goodman, 
   "Public Sphere and Private Life", History and Theory, 31, 1992, pp.1-20. 
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was to be a collective enterprise, co-directed by Otto Brunner and Werner Conze, 
mapping conceptual change in the German language between approximately 1750 
and 1850. These conceptual changes would, according to Koselleck, be characte-
rized by four tendencies:
1. Democratization. Concepts previously bound to specific social strata and 
professional corporations spread to other social groups. This process of social 
diffusion was generally accompanied by a loss of terminological precision. 
2. Temporalization. Whereas traditional vocabularies were largely static, new 
conceptualizations were dynamic, indicating processes and often oriented towards 
the future, expressing expectations and aspirations. 
3. Ideologiesierbarkeit. Because concepts were no longer bound to specific 
social groups and professions, they became more general and more abstract, espe-
cially in the form of - isms and singular nouns ("liberty"). Concepts generally 
became less specific and particular, therefore more diffuse and consequently more 
open to various interpretations and usages. Meaning thus became more depend-
ent on the users and the context of usage. 
4. Politicization. In connection with the Ideologiesierbarkeit there was a clear 
trend to politicizing language use, which was especially clear in the growing use 
of political slogans and political propaganda.3o 
     Not all of these characteristics have received equal attention or have 
proved to be equally fruitful. The best documented issue is probably that of 
temporalization, Verzeitlichung. This aspect was close to the professional in-
terests of the historians, and in Germany in particular had a long scholarly tradi-
tion (especially with respect to historicism).31 Koselleck, in any case, has devoted 
many subtle essays to it.32 In his view the Sattelzeit not only marks the transi-
tion to a new period, but actually to the first era in human history characterized 
30 Cf. R. Koselleck, "Richtlinien fur das Lexicon politisch-sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit", Archiv fur 
   Begriffsgeschichte, 11, 1967, pp.81-99. See also the Introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 
   Vol 1, 1972, pp.XVI-XVIII. 
31 Cf. Hans Peter Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, Berkeley, 1975. 
32 See especially the essays collected in Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, 
   Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1979. Keith Tribe translated it into English as Futures Past, Cam-
   bridge, 1985; see also his "The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe project," Comparative Studies in Society 
   and History, 31, 1989, pp. 180-184. For the issue of temporalization in the sciences ee especially Wolf 
   Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverstandlichkeiten in den Wissens-
   chaften des 18. and 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1978. 
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by a predominant sense of historical time. This temporal structure of human ex-
perience is visible in an unprecedented sense of change and renewal (emergence of 
concepts like progress and development), in the notion of an open future which 
calls for human intervention and "planning", and in the separation of "experi-
ence" and "expectation." 33 
      These changes are apparent in various ways. Old and static concepts may 
be redefined and thus become more dynamic, often simultaneously expressing a 
movement or process and an expectation. Old topoi, more generally, either 
loose their meaning, change in a more dynamic sense, or are overshadowed by 
new terms and concepts. 
     The program as it was outlined by Koselleck has, in fact, only partially 
been fulfilled in the volumes of the lexicon. In a certain sense the method of the 
whole enterprise - a new form of conceptual history - has been more success-
ful that its initial thesis. In the lexicon, the theme of the Sattelzeit is most appa-
rent in the issues which touch upon the question of time and temporalization, 
and in the analysis of neologisms (revolution, conservatism, socialism, etc.). But 
a great deal of the effort has actually gone into very detailed analyses of ancient 
and medieval terminology, leaving relatively little time and space for the issues 
specifically related to the transformations between 1750 and 1850.34 Another 
reason why the theme of the Sattelzeit may not have received the attention in-
itially suggested, is the lack of a comparative material. In his detailed analysis of 
the concept of society, for example, Manfred Riedel demonstrates that it was 
only in Hegel's philosophy of law that the modern notion of society was first 
systematically articulated.35 From a broader, European perspective, however, 
this was comparatively late and not in any way restricted to the German states. 
What is lacking from Riedel's analysis is such a treatment of conceptual develop-
ments in the English and French speaking world.36 
     In the reception of the lexicon abroad, considerations of conceptual his-
33 For a recent and more extensive statement see R. Koselleck, "Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert als Beginn 
   der Neuzeit in Epochenschwelle and Epochenbewusstsein. Herausgegeben von R. Herzog& R. 
   Koselleck, Miinchen, W. Fink Verlag, 1987, pp.269-282. The significance of the Sattelzeit for the rise 
   of historicism is far from being undisputed. Scholars such as Donald Kelley, Julian Franklin and John 
   Pocock have argued that this view particularly obscures the work of French legal scholars of theRe-
    naissance, see Zachary Sayre Schiffman, "Renaissance historicism reconsidered", History and Theory, 
   24, 1985, pp.170-182. 
34 In a recent statement Koselleck argues that the initial presuppositions of the project have grown into 
    an "intellectual straightjacket", see "Some reflections on the temporal structure of conceptual change", 
   in Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (eds.), Main Trends in Cultural History, Amsterdam, Rodo-
   pi, 1994, pp.7-16. 
35 M. Riedel, "Gesellschaft, Biirgerliche", in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Stuttgart, 1972, vol.1, 
   pp.672-725. 
36 see Keith Michael Baker, "Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual his-
    tory", in Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (eds.), op. cit., pp.95-120. 
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tory, as a specific type of intellectual history and historical scholarship, have often 
received more attention than the Sattelzeit. The methods and results of the Beg-
riffsgeschichte were compared to somewhat similar approaches like historical 
semantics,37 the tradition of the history of ideas,38 and the study of political lan-
guages and vocabularies as advocated by the Cambridge school.39 
      In Germany, or so it seems, one actually finds the same tendency. Since 
the publication of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Rolf Reichardt, a former 
assistant of Koselleck, launched the Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in 
Frankreich 1680-1820 (1985-). Reichhardt and his collaborators have limited 
themselves in time, and have broadened the approach, among others, to include 
French contributors and their historical traditions. An initiative which has pre-
ceded the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe is the Historisches Worterbuch der Philo-
sophic (1971-). This lexicon, mainly produced by philosophers, represents a 
more traditional form of conceptual history as was conceived by Erich Rothacker, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Joachim Ritter. It contains many more and shorter 
entries, but lacks the attention for the social history of conceptual change that is 
present in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. As Melvin Richter notes: "The GG 
originated in a style of historical inquiry that stressed hermeneutics and hence the 
importance of conceptual apparatus, horizons and self-understandings of historical 
actors. However, as a result of incorporating social history in its framework, 
both Brunner and Conze helped shift Begriffsgeschichte away from a philo-
sophical and hermeneutic method towards another incorporating social history of 
a sort more acceptable to historians. " 40 
     An internalist and predominantly philosophical style of intellectual history 
was thus opposed to a more historical mode of analysis which was more sensitive 
to contextual questions.41 This opposition was also relevant in the English set-
ting, where the Cambridge school of intellectual historians developed its prog-
ram, in part, as a critique of the way Oxford philosophers treated the history of 
37 I. Veit-Brause, "A note on Begriffsgeschichte" History and Theory, 20, 1980, pp.61-67; P.B.M. 
   Blaas, "Begriffsgeschiedenis en historische semantiek", Theoretische geschiedenis, 7, 1980, pp. 161-174. 
   For the German debate on this issue see R. Koselleck (ed.), Historische Semantik and Begriffsges-
   chichte, Stuttgart, Klett/Cotta, 1979. 
38 M. Richter, "Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas", Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 1987, 
   pp.247-263. 
39 Melvin Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Ges-
   chichtliche Grundbegriffe," History and Theory, 24, 1990, pp.38-70. 
40 M. Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages," p.45. See also Melvin Richter, 
   "Conceptual History (Begrirffsgeschichte) and Political Theory", Political Theory, Vol.14, No.4, 
   November 1986, pp.604-637 and the critical exchange between him and Jeremy Rayner: Jeremey 
   Rayner, "On Begriffsgeschichte", Political Theory, Vol.16, No.3, August 1988, pp.496-501; Melvin 
   Richter, "Understanding Begriffsgeschichte: A Rejoinder", Political Theory, Vol.17, No.2, May1989, 
   pp.296-301. 
41 For a critical exchange on the philosophical assumptions underlying Koselleck's project relative to 
   those of philosophical hermeneutics see the lecture, in the Old Aula of the University of Heidelberg, 
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political theory. 
     Curiously enough Koselleck's ideas about the Sattelzeit have received par-
ticular attention from system theorists in sociology. Niklas Luhmann and some 
of his colleagues have been anxious to recast their functionalist theory in a more 
historical manner, and for that purpose have extensively drawn on Koselleck's 
work. Luhmann's interest in the semantics of modern time was certainly shaped 
by the tradition of the Begriffsgeschichte, but he has also extensively drawn on 
Koselleck's ideas of the Sattelzeit. Luhmann reinterpreted the Sattelzeit as a 
period of societal transformation in which the hierarchial system of estates and 
orders was replaced by a system which is "functionally differentiated" in a plural-
ity of subsystems.42 This notion of modernization as a process of "functional dif-
ferentiation" provided the starting point for Stichweh's work on discipline forma-
tion and similar studies on the cultural transformations during this period.43
Linguistic Contextualism and the New Sociology of Knowledge 
One of the most prominent sources of inspiration away from "tunnel history" 
has been the programme of what is known as the Cambridge school, developed 
by scholars such as John Pocock, Quentin Skinner and John Dunn. Their chal-
lenge to the conventional history of ideas has centered around the conception of 
"language" and how it could be used in historical studies . According to Pocock 
"...if we are to have a history of political thought constructed on authentically 
historical principles, we must have means of knowing what an author "was 
doing" when he wrote, or published a text. 1144 
      Hence, to understand what an author - or an entire "school" - really 
"meant" we must make intelligible the langue he inhabits which gives meaning 
to the parole he performs in it. According to Pocock, at least three conse-
   by Koselleck and the response by Gadamer in connection with the celebration of Gadamer's eighty 
   fifth birthday on December 6, 1986, subsequently published by the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences: 
   Reinhart Koselleck - Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik and Historik, Heidelberg, Carl Winter. 
   Universitatsverlag, 1987, with Koselleck's contribution called "Historik and Hermeneutik" and 
    Gadamer's response "Historik and Sprache - eine Antwort". This exchange make quite clear thede-
   gree to which Koselleck historical inquiry is premised on the validity of a kind of transcendental 
    Katergorienlehre, or a set of otologically transcendent dichotomies - in some ways reminiscent of cate-
   gories familiar from both Heidegger and Schmitt - that help structure the process of imputing mean-
    ing to conceptual and historical occurrences. 
42 See the different volumes of Gesellschaftsstruktur and Semantik, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
   1980/81. 
43 See, for example, S.J. Schmidt, Die Selbstorganisation des Sozialsystems Literatur im 18. Jahrhun-
    dert, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1989. Crucial for Luhmann's analysis of functionally differenti-
    ated subsystems are mechanisms of self-organization. On this notion see W. Krohn, G. Kuppers and 
   H. Nowotny (eds.), Selforganization: Portrait of a Scientific Revolution (Sociology of the Sciences 
   Yearbook), Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. 
44 John G.A. Pocock, Virtue. Commerce and History. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 
   p.5. For Skinner's position, which is derived from the Austinian notion of speech acts, see Meaning 
   and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, edited by James Tully, Cambridge, Polity press, 1988. 
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quences follow from the involvement with "language" which have wide implica-
tions for intellectual history. First, its history must be evenementielle because 
the scholar "is interested in acts performed and the contexts in and upon which 
they were performed". Secondly, it will be textual and concentrate upon printed 
utterances and responses. Thirdly it will deal mainly with idioms and rhetoric 
rather than with grammar; with the affective and effective content of speech 
rather its structure.45 
     Although the focus of this orientation was initially on political in the early 
modern period, it has gradually broadened to include other intellectual genres, 
such as political economy, as well as somewhat more recent periods.46 
     There can be no doubt that the linguistic contextual approach to the analy-
sis of political texts, perhaps most closely associated with the works of Quentin 
Skinner, has resulted in works that are among the most seminal scholarly ones of 
recent decades, works that have contributed to a profound renewal in the study 
of intellectual history and political philosophy. Scholars in this tradition, and 
maybe most clearly so Skinner himself, have been careful to warn against a belief 
that their approach purports to solve all kinds of problems in the historical study 
of texts and societal practices. Thus it may be only fair to highlight three types 
of features that might be relevant in a study of the discourses of social science in 
their institutional contexts but that require an analysis that go beyond what has 
been the focus of interest of the Cambridge historians. 
     One such feature pertains to the role of macro-societal institutions in his-
torical transformations, although again it is only fair to say that Pocock, rather 
than Skinner, and to some extent Istvan Hont have also dealt with such macro-
societal institutions. By and large, however, intellectual historians in the contex-
tual tradition have tried to focus the analysis on particular texts and their more 
immediate institutional and intellectual contexts. 
     Another feature that, maybe for pragmatic rather than methodological 
reasons, has not been the main focus of interest of the linguistic contextualists but 
that must be highly relevant for any social theory that takes reflexivity seriously, 
has to do with the political and institutional consequences of intellectual contrib-
45 John G.A. Pocock "The concept of language and the metier d'historien: some considerations on 
   practice", in Anthony Pagden (ed.) The Languages of Political Theory in early- Modern Europe. 
    Cambridge University Press, pp.19-38. For a critique of the contextualist approach see e.g., Mark 
   Bevir, "The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism", History and Theory, Vol.31, No.3, 1992, pp.276-
  298. 
46 Good examples include I. Hont & M. Ignatief (eds.), Wealth and Virtue. The Shaping of Political 
   Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; K. Tribe, 
    Governing the Economy. The Reformation of Economic Discourse in Germany. 1750-1840, Cam-
   bridge 1988; Stephan Collini et al., That Noble Science of Politics. A Study in 19th Century Intellec-
   tual History, Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1983.
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utions. Even if contributions of social theory and science are seen in terms of 
speech acts, ensembles of such speech acts also may have per-locutionary force 
that must be analyzed in the study of the institutionally constitutive effects of 
political language. Thus ranges of policy options are often conceptually made 
possible or constrained in this way and so may the very existence of important 
institutional practices be, as already indicated in the previous section. 
     Thirdly, and maybe most important in theoretical terms, even if ideas are 
seen in context, we are not just dealing with a hyper text in cyber space but with 
ideas that are not expressed or inscribed by themselves but by someone with a 
body, with dreams, hopes and memories, someone who moves in space and 
time, someone who has to be theorized by a social theory that agency seriously. 
Again, it is certainly no "deficiency" in contextual intellectual history that it has 
tended to assert the role of agency rather than to theorize it. However there is an 
unresolved tension in this tradition between on the one hand taking the writing, 
speaking and acting human beings that produced the texts seriously and on the 
other to reject a hermeneutical understanding of the agent as both impossible and 
unfruitful. Instead of an individually particular producer of speech acts, we then 
have an agent that is simply structured by the properties of the cultural and insti-
tutional setting of the context of the speech acts, an agent that may appear as 
almost as standardized as that of modern rational choice theory.
Another major source of inspiration for a renewed understanding of the develop-
ment of the social sciences is the increasingly historically oriented sociology of 
the sciences. Moving beyond merely theoretical debates and its realistic or relati-
vistic implications, current research in `science studies' has not only provided 
many detailed case studies of contemporary scientific practice, it has also contri-
buted substantially to a reconceptualization of the history of the sciences. 41 The 
new history of science is not primarily concerned with specific facts, particular 
research specialties or individual theories. It is, on the contrary, problem 
oriented and tends to focus on issues which cut across conventional boundaries in 
order to rethink the historical constitution of categories such as objectivity, in-
duction, experiment, scientific experience, abstraction and proof, as well as its 
psychological and socio-political conditions.48 
47 Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism, Chicago, 
    Chicago University Press, 1993; Julian Martin, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural 
   Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, 
    Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Princeton, Princeton Uni-
    versity Press, 1985; Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-
    Century England, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994. 
48 Lorraine Daston, "Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe", Critical 
    Inquiry, 18, 1991, pp.93-124; idem, "Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective", Social Studies of 
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     Both the Cambridge school and the historically oriented research in scien-
ce studies have proven the fruitfulness of returning to the early modern period 
and inquire into the genesis of modern concepts and current arrangements. Re-
turning to the period when none of these notions were self-evident, when they 
had both others meanings and powerful alternatives, is thus a particularly fruitful 
device not merely for new historical understanding, but also for a fresh look on 
present-day concerns.
Social Theory and History: The Tripartite Divide in Contem-
porary Social Science Debates 
Parallel to, but in scholarly terms largely unrelated to, the reexamination of the 
common roots of social science, history and political and moral philosophy, so-
cial scientists are increasingly debating the proper role of historical inquiry in so-
cial science. Greatly simplified but retaining essential features of the controversy 
in this theoretical debate, some important dividing lines run as follows.
                      Neo-inductivism 
A first group of social scientists basically argue for a strict separation between the 
historical discipline and the social-scientific in terms of their methodology and 
historians' and social scientists' allegedly distinctive expertise in handling different 
types of material, and their different empirical foci. Sometimes this position is 
linked to an epistemological one that might be termed neo-empiricist and neo-in-
ductivist. For the social scientist, a historical orientation can and should ultimate-
ly be handled exclusively using statistical techniques of variance in which time is 
a dimension and the task is to study variance in each property analysed "through 
observation of the same unit (a population, individuals, groups, institutions, 
countries, etc.) located at different points in a temporal sequence. " 49
    Science, 22, 1992, pp.597-618. On probability and statistics see Eric Brian, La mesure de 1 Etat. 
   Administrateurs et geometres au XVIIIe siecle, Paris: Albin Michel, 1994; Lorraine Daston , Classical 
   Probability in the Enlightenment, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; Alain Desrosieres , La 
   politique des grands nombres. Histoire de la raison statistique, Paris, Editions La Decouverte, 1993; 
   Gerd Gigerenzer (ed.), The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life, 
   Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit
   of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995. Norton Wise 
   (ed.), The Values of Precision, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995. 
49 The quotation is taken from Stefano Bartolini, "On Time and Comparative Research", Journal of 
   Theoretical Politics, 5(2), 1993, 131-167, where the quotation is from p.135. Basically Bartolini 
   argues that vague historical sociology of a qualitative nature has led to little but confusion and ambi-
   guity and that the real task for rigorous research is to move ahead in a way that permits truly compa-
   rative analysis across both time and space.
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     This position may have much to recommend it. It obviously entails a 
radical normative prescription for the social sciences rather than an analysis of 
their emergence and development as a particular set of discursive and institutional 
practices. Such radical normative positions always raise the problem of their 
own interpretation and validation. In what sense can scholarly practices that do 
not conform to the norm be excluded or "forbidden"? On exactly what grounds 
- except a general appeal to rigour and clarity - can some scholarly practices be 
judged as somehow "unworthy" or invalid? 
      Even if we were to accept such pronouncements, how do we deal with the 
excluded practices and results, particularly if they elucidate sides that are neg-
lected or ignored by the allegedly more stringent methods? Should we just 
ignore such results? Should we take notice of them but treat them with skeptic-
ism? But if we do so, we have already acknowledged the possibility of reasoned 
argumentation beyond the bounds of our own stringently empiricist methodolo-
gy-If this is the case, then why should we not fully explore th  potentials in 
such a more extended epistemological position rather than stifling our own 
efforts by limiting ourselves to an over-restricted domain of research? And even 
if we did tie ourselves to a restrictive methodology, we might nevertheless argue 
for it and against other methodologies in ways that violate that very methodolo-
gy by adopting discourse and dialogue rather than statistical analysis of variance. 
If we do this, how are we to judge our own argumentational involvement with 
our perceived scholarly opponents? 
      Of more immediate pragmatic importance for the purposes of the present 
interest in the emergence and evolution of forms of inquiry parallel to the forma-
tion of modern societal institutions is that the radically restrictive position offers 
no real assistance. Even if we were generally sympathetic to such a position and 
trying to heed the normative advice offered (or ordained), it would give scant 
guidance in our search to understand the historical development of the social sci-
ences themselves; that is, unless we were willing to engage in that exercise in a 
way that would make mockery of almost everything that has been written on the 
subject so far.
                     Neo-functionalism 
Secondly, there are those scholars who, in a broad functionalist tradition, have 
tended to welcome historical reasoning but basically as a way of illustrating the 
sequential, often unilinear, unfolding of a process of societal modernization and 
differentiation. Despite two decades of sustained criticism, functionalist theoriz-
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ing, mainly in the form of a modernization or a differentiation theory, still repre-
sents a dominating mode of explaining historical change in mainstream social sci-
ence theory. The intellectual origins of this type of theory are often located in 
the period of consolidation and institutionalization of the social science disciplines 
touched upon above. Thus although - in the words of Jeffrey Alexander -
"the notion that societ
y changes through a process of institutional specialization 
can be traced back to ancient times, the modern theory of social change as 
differentiation may be seen as beginning with Durkheim. " 50 This type of 
theorizing has exerted a dominant influence in modern sociology and anthropolo-
gy and has also played a highly prominent role, whether as a `tacit' backdrop or 
as an explicit theoretical program in political science. 
      In classical social science at the turn of the century, similar modes of 
reasoning and of interpreting the process of modernization were, however, also 
espoused by Weber and the historical school in German economics and social 
science and, in another version, by the then dominant neo-Rankian school in 
German historical scholarship. In Swedish political science in the same period 
Rudolf Kjellen's organicist and historicist reasoning has several features in com-
mon with the analyses of the neo-Rankians but also with political geographers 
such as Ratzel. In Britain, evolutionary types of reasoning had been elaborated 
by Herbert Spencer, who had come to exert a profound influence on not only 
British research.51 However, "it was from Durkheim, not from Spencer, that 
subsequent thinking about differentiation in the social sciences has drawn." 52 
     This type of theorizing has been characteristic not only of classical func-
tionalism in the Parsonian vein but also of much contemporary research in 
anthropology, sociology, political science and history. In political science this is 
true of modernization theorists studying developing countries in comparative 
perspective and of convergence theorists offering analyses of the ultimate con-
vergence of all political systems in modern industrial nations. Durkheimian 
theorizing of this sort also deeply influenced political, science via the 
Durkheimian-cum-Weberian (predominantly Durkheimian) heritage of Parsons' 
functional theorizing, transmitted to political science largely via David Easton's 
systems-theoretical interpretation of Parsons. In sociology, the impact of Dur-
kheim on sociological theory both in the French and in the Anglo-Saxon intellec-
tual world has probably never been more widespread than now with the Marxian 
50 Jeffrey C. Alexander, Action and Its Environments: Towards a New Synthesis, New York, Columbia 
   University Press, 1988, p.51. 
51 See e.g. the overviews of Geoffrey Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair: A History of Sociology, 
   Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, and Reba Soffer, Ethics and Society: The Revolution 
   in the Social Sciences in England 1870-1914, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.
52 Alexander, Action, p.51. 
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challenge largely having collapsed and even ethnomethodologists such as Garfink-
el calling themselves Durkheimians. 
     A similar influence has been exerted on the discipline of history itself, 
whether in the largely Weberian tradition of "societal history" (Gesellschaftsges-
chichte) or in more conventional forms of historical research, often enough 
allegedly "a-theoretical." S.N. Eisenstadt, himself a friend and colleague of Par-
sons at Harvard, is one of the scholars who in the 1960's most eloquently high-
lighted the significance of differentiation theory to historical and comparative 
sociology.53 It is hardly coincidental that Jeffrey Alexander, who in a sense rep-
resents a direct functionalist lineage and theoretical position in a later generation, 
chose to quote Eisenstadt, when he himself a quarter of a century later chose to 
expound the basic features of differentiation theory at a time when it had already 
been under severe attack for quite some time:54 
      "Differentiation comes closer than any other contemporary conception to 
     identifying the overall contours of civilizational change, and the texture,
      immanent dangers, and real promises of modern life. As a general proc-
     ess, differentiation is fairly well understood, and it is this general outline 
     that provides the backdrop for making sense of everyday life today. In-
     stitutions gradually become more specialized. Familial control over social 
     organization decreases. Political processes become less directed by the 
     obligations and rewards of patriarchy, and the division of labor is orga-
     nized more according to economic criteria than by reference simply to age 
     and sex. Community membership can reach beyond ethnicity to territo-
      rial and political criteria ... In terms of these general contours of world 
     history, and the intuitive representation of modernity they provide, the 
     immanent dangers and promises of modernity can be understood. Thus,
     because of the need to develop flexible and independent control over social 
      complexity, large-scale bureaucratic and impersonal organizations emerge. " 
     This quotation nicely highlights three major points about differentiation 
theory, namely: 
      First, that it does, indeed, provide a comprehensive account of the con-
tours of the history of the major societal macro-institutions as well as of every-
day life activities. These general contours, however, were in one why or another
53 
54
S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, New York, The Free Press, 1963, and "Institu-
tionalization and Social Change", American Sociological Review, vol.29, 1964, pp.235-47. 
Alexander, Action, p.49 f. Nor is it coincidental that Alexander in his four volume opus Theoretical 
Logic in Sociology, Berkeley, Uuiversity of California Press, 1982-1983, chose to write these volumes 
with Parsons' The Structure of Social Action as a constant point of reference. 
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recognized by most proponents of various social science projects at the time of 
the emergence of social science disciplines in their modern form in the late 
nineteenth century. This was, largely what then and ever since has been referred 
to in German academic discourse as the coming of die Moderne. Thus some 
general recognition of this secular transformation of the social and political world 
does not necessarily entail acceptance of a Durkheimian anti-individualistic and 
functionalist account. 
     Secondly, differentiation theory is in one sense circular. Social and politic-
al activities as well as those of everyday life are accounted for in terms of syste-
mic properties such as complexity, coordination, control. But if the problem is 
precisely to account for transformations of societal institutions, the argument that 
institutions differentiate as a response to overall societal complexity and division 
of labour in the economic sphere will inevitably involve some element of circu-
larity. 
     If this is so, then clearly - and thirdly - the quotation also clearly indi-
cates that historicity in social science theory delineates a problematique that ulti-
mately points to another and more fundamental one, namely that of the very re-
lationship between actions and activities on the one hand and structural and insti-
tutional conditions and properties on the other. This is the problematique of 
agency and structure, which is in a sense the most fundamental one in social 
science theorizing. This realization has also been central to a newer broad group 
of social scientists who will be briefly mentioned.
           Historical-sociological institutionalism 
A large group of social scientists have during the past fifteen years brought back 
in not only history but the serious study of the state and other societal macro-in-
stitutions - to paraphrase the title of one of the most quoted volumes of this 
group." The group explicitly and strongly rejects the previously dominant mode 
of functional-evolutionary theorizing as characterized by e. g. the modernization 
theory and convergence theory developing during the 1950's, 60's and 70's. In-
stead they advocate a historically informed social science that may draw on his-
torical examples and analogies but that is premised on a rejection of all notions of 
linear evolution or theories of the existence of different historical "stages" or 
"phases . " 
     This body of criticism, of the type of historical, institutional social science 
developing recently, particularly by Theda Skocpol and her collaborators, is easy
55 Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds.), op. cit. 
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to follow. However it raises some fundamental problems. Thus there seems to 
be no need to let the rejection of accounts in terms of a unilinear process of 
societal evolution mean abandoning all efforts to develop theories of the charac-
teristics of a nexus of institutions at a particular point in a particular historical 
era. In fact such modes of analysis seem possible, fruitful and indeed necessary 
for understanding the interaction between political institutions, most importantly 
the modern nation state, and such societal institutions as primarily focus their 
activities on scientific, discursive practices; the modern research oriented universi-
ty being a primary example. 
     Within the range of efforts to bring history back into the core of sociology 
and social science we find scholars who have taken the agential, the discursive 
and the linguistic constitution of social institution more seriously into account 
than either the neo-inductivists or the neo-functionalists have done. However, a 
careful inquiry into these features of social life is more or less reserved for the 
study of the micro-settings where day-to-day practices are being reproduced or 
violated, whereas macro-societal institutions and change tend to be studied in 
ways that are just as systemic and overarching as those of the neo-functionalists 
- and often with a weaker theoretical , more ad hoc, justification. 
     For this chasm between microanalysis and macroanalysis to be closed , a 
much closer link seems to be required between intellectual and institutional 
history-writing" - and this again, as already pointed out, is one of the reasons 
why a pure neo-inductivist position leads to a dead end. The topos where histor-
ical, linguistic and institutional analysis meet is constituted by the category of 
agency.
  Linking Social Theory and Intellectual History: Conceptual 
          Change, Reflexivity and Human Agency 
Conceptual Change and Reflexivity 
The reflexivity of modern societies is, as argued throughout this essay, apparent 
in many parts of the self-understanding of the social sciences. Thus the social 
sciences have always defined as a primary task the tracing of the evolution of the 
major societal macro-institutions of economy, polity and discourse. Mary Doug-
las, the well-known British anthropologist, among many others, has made the 
56 Some of these issues are taken up from a broad functionalist perspective in Jeffrey C. Alexander, 
   Structure and Meaning: Rethinking Classical Sociology, New York, Columbia UniversityPress, 1989, 
   and S.N. Eisenstadt, Power, Trust, and Meaning: Essays in Sociological Theory and Analysis, Chica-
   go, The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
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point that "[b]oth Durkheim and Weber focused their inquiry ... on the relation 
between ideas and institutions." 57 However, classical social science showed a 
greater interest in and a greater sensitivity to the analysis of the economy or the 
polity per se and to their mutual interaction than to their dependence on and re-
lationship to modes of discourse. In this respect the dominant tendency in post-
World-War-II functionalist theorizing, to define modernity primarily in terms of 
economic-technological and political transformations (the Industrial and French 
Revolutions respectively and their long-term consequences) reflected a long tradi-
tion of thought. 
     The social and political sciences have recently seen a renewed and streng-
thened emphasis of this classical orientation towards the constitution and de-
velopment of the major institutions of modernity. The "rediscovery" of institu-
tions in political science is but one expression of this." Corresponding shifts in 
political philosophy, in sociological theorizing about societal macro-institutions59 
and in theorizing about economic institutions, too, indicate that a similar re-
newed emphasis has occurred in these fields. 60 
     The reexamination of the historical grounding of contemporary social sci-
ence theories is also clearly manifested in the renewed emphasis on the themes of 
collective identity, public sphere and political order. The recent resurgence of in-
terest in these themes directly parallels societal events that have served to high-
light the historical conditioning of much of social-science theorizing and have 
forced upon social scientists an awareness of the reflexivity of social science itself. 
This influence has tended to be more powerful and immediate than most of what 
the long debates about "historical sociology" have produced. Thus many of the 
arguments of these debates - both those of the critics and the protagonists of 
historical sociology - somehow seem to have tacitly assumed that the real ques-
tion is whether it is feasible and desirable to add to an already well-functioning 
set of disciplinary sociological practices a dose of historical inquiry. The debates 
then tend to revolve around the question of whether such a dose would add some
57 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986, p.93. 
58 James C. March and Johan P. Olsen are but two of the most prominent proponents of this research 
    orientation. See e. g. their volumes Rediscovering Institutions, New York, The Free Press, 1989, and 
    Democratic Governance, New York, The Free Press, 1995. 
59 In this respect volumes some ten years ago such as Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 
   Cambridge, Polity, 1985, and Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), 
   Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, heralded the beginning of 
   what might be termed "the institutional turn" in post-functionalist sociology. 
60 The works of Douglass C. North are of course path-breaking but mention could also be made of 
   works by historians, political scientists and sociologists such as Rogers J. Hollingsworth, Philippe C. 
   Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Governing Capitalist Economies, New York, Oxford Uni-
    versity Press, 1994, or by economic historians and economists such as Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis 
    and Bo Gustafsson (eds.), Markets and Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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taste or spoil the whole meal. However, as argued throughout this essay, much 
more rarely is the very historicity and reflexivity of social science itself taken 
seriously into account. Social science itself is a historical phenomenon and its 
very key categories are historically constructed and situated and premised on pre-
suppositions that may be conveniently overlooked sometimes, but not in periods 
when societal developments themselves tend to invalidate them. In such a situa-
tion a historically blind social science will tend to waver between parochialism 
and borrowing from public and media debates. This appears partly true for the 
renewed theoretical interest in such key categories as collective identity , civil 
society and notions of the constitutive features of polity itself. 
      It has become increasingly clear that we may now look back at two cen-
turies of European modernity in which ideals of nationhood, democracy and con-
stitutionalism emerged in the wake of the Great Revolutions, particularly the 
French, and have exerted a formative influence. In scholarly terms, however, it 
is also increasingly clear that the foundations and premises of this particular order 
have often been tacit rather than explicit, taken for granted rather than carefully 
examined. Now, with a vivid and wide-ranging debate about the alleged end of 
history, about the coming of 'postmodernity', about the 'Eurocentric' founda-
tions of social order and social science and about the equally loudly proclaimed 
"death of the natio n state" in the face of a new European and global order, 
theoretically informed research in the social and human sciences inevitably in-
volves a careful analysis of the historical grounding of social science itself and its 
role in providing key categories in making modern societies appear meaningful 
and, indeed, conceivable. 
     Any major transformation of macro-societal institutions will involve a 
deep change in their symbolic evaluation. Such change will involve struggles 
concerning the interpretation and interpretive hegemony of the symbolic aspects 
of institutions - be they the right to appropriate symbols of a nation or the right 
to exercise control over the life and death of the subjects or citizens of a polity. 
     It will also involve the promulgation of broad visions and programmes de-
fining societal actors, and their place relative to each other and to some historical 
mission or duty. Such evaluations will draw on and elaborate cultural concep-
tualizations and definitions of the givens of human life - ultimately those of the 
human body, age, sex, growth, and aging: the physical givens and their relation-
ships to different mental and physical capacities; the relative importance in human 
existence of temporality (past and future), and the major arenas of social activity. 
     Such categories then tend to be cast in a naturalistic form, but the process 
of their construction is of course a social one. However, the precise nature of 
this process is open to different interpretations. On the one hand, the process 
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can be depicted as an exercise in linguistic and social construction and nothing 
more. A major advantage of such an interpretation is that it avoids far-reaching 
ontological assumptions. The problem, however, is that by denying the found-
ational nature of these assumptions of the categorical givens of human existence, 
it renounces the possibility of distinguishing these basic premises from any other 
linguistically mediated phenomena. Such accounts of the basic premises and 
givens of a society will not be trivial but they tend to be circular in that any 
account of them will have to draw on accounts of other categories within the 
given society or "form of life" that in turn refer to the more basic premises. 
      Needless to say, on such an interpretation, the relevance of an account of 
this kind for "our own" society is a matter of sheer coincidence. On the other 
hand, in a classical hermeneutic tradition, the constructing of the basic premises 
of social order may be seen to rest on a set of transcendent categories that consti-
tute the ontological presuppositions of any language game. The strength of this 
position - which seems to be the one elaborated by Koselleck, drawing on both 
Heidegger and Schmitt, in his project of a Historik - is that it allows for a kind 
of social type theory (a la Russell or von Wright) and a reconstruction of the 
different levels of a social and linguistic ontology. However, the possibly insolu-
ble problem is that even the most basic categorical construction - be it only a 
most general one concerning erection of a boundary between inside and outside or 
the temporal distinction between before and after, i.e., a social, yet pre-linguis-
tic, topography - can never be undertaken ex nihilo. It can only occur against 
the backdrop of a particular society and its linguistic and social interactions, and 
any pretence to the successful construction of a transcendent Kategorienlehre of 
the essential elements of human and social being, underpinning any social and 
linguistic analysis, is bound either to turn inward onto itself in Holderlinian si-
lence or to become the imposition of a veiled but deeply socially structured 
ontology.61 
     Both interpretations of a society's basic interpretative categories highlight 
the fact that these categories cannot be just naturalistically conceived: they are 
socially mediated. Shifting conceptions of temporality and societal order in the 
course of the French Revolution provide just one fascinating example of the so-
cial embeddedness of such basic categories and how promulgations of a revolu-
tionary vision may involve a reconstruction of such categories. 
      Basic interpretative categories are also linked to and may have fundamental 
consequences for the specifications and construction of the major roles in a socie-
61 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Koselleck and Gadamer on this point, see 
    Reinhart Koselleck and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik and Historik, Heidelberg, Carl Winter
    Universitatsverlag, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1987. 
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ty, be they familial, gender, occupational or political - and of the situations in 
which they are enacted. Further, visions or programmes may also provide the 
starting points for structuring preference frameworks of people. In this sense, 
preferences are neither given nor arbitrarily constructed nor invented; but, rather, 
continuously discovered and elaborated - or, sometimes, discarded. 
     The construction of these aspects of social life constitutes a crucial dimen-
sion of the interaction between elites, influentials and broader sectors of society. 
The central core of such interaction - such modes of human agency - is that 
among all participants, some orientation develops towards the `charismatic' 
dimension of human activity, some predisposition to belong in such dimensions, 
in the implementation and "reproduction" of such visions. In other words, for 
most individuals, their possible participation in such activities constitutes a com-
ponent of their goals or preferences. This dispositional property of human agen-
cy constitutes - as so clearly seen for the general case of dispositional concepts 
by empiricists and Popperians alike several decades ago - a forceful reminder of 
the limitations of a narrowly behavioural orientation in the social sciences. On 
the other hand, however, it constitutes the very link between an analysis of struc-
ture - in terms of sets of structural conditions proper to certain types of be-
haviour - and the transformation of agential capacity into actualization in action.
Conceptual Change and Human Agency 
Social science deals ultimately with the interactions of human beings and these in-
teractions are, for all practical purposes, linguistically mediated. Thus the analy-
sis of action and the language and rhetoric in which action is couched, the inter-
pretations we make, the meanings we impute in this analysis is, for better or for 
worse, the stuff that social science one way or the other has to come to terms 
with. Needless to say, it may choose to try to ignore it and pretend that mean-
ings are transparent and preferences perpetually revealed and the analysis of lan-
guage and text a superfluous luxury. 
     There may have been times when such a scholarly posture might have 
appeared as refreshingly naive. Today there can be little doubt that as a research 
strategy it would be little short of a recipe for disaster. Furthermore, after the 
intense methodological debates in the past two decades about the analysis of lan-
guage and text in all of the social sciences, it is quite simply not possible to 
engage in serious social science research without being able to justify the mode of 
linguistic and textual analysis undertaken - or else to risk inadvertently stumb-
ling into ontological black holes. 
     For historically oriented social science, does the acknowledgement that 
                              109
Bjorn WITTROCK 
human interaction is linguistically mediated, dependent on intentions and inter-
pretations of human individuals, commit us to the view that there is nothing but 
a chaotic and fragmented flow of events beyond any intellectual grasp? Does it 
force us to accept the view that matters of the validity of statements are but 
flawed expressions of an untenable representational theory of language since no 
one interpretation can step out of its own language game and establish the legiti-
macy of its statement via extra-linguistic comparison of statements and reality? 
     It is exactly this kind of explicitly anti-realist reasoning that for some time 
has enjoyed a period of fashionable acclaim, first in some of the humanistic disci-
plines - but less so in historical research itself - and then, via philosophizing 
popularizers, in social science. Somehow the realization that traditional empiric-
ism had long been dead in analytical philosophy was seen to absolve us from 
trying to understand some alleged societal reality and rather entail our engage-
ment in games of ironic reconstruction and deconstruction. 
     Probably the most systematic and theoretically well argued representative 
of this powerful recent tendency is not Lyotard or Derrida but rather the Amer-
ican philosopher Richard Rorty. His reasoning, astute, elegant and enjoyable 
though it is, in exemplary fashion highlights the dual nature of much "postmod-
ernist" discourse on society. On the one hand, rejection of naive empiricism -
such as the belief in some version of the verification principle, a belief, incidental-
ly, that analytical philosophy itself gave up about half a century ago - forces us 
to accept total relativism: 
         the central claim of Chapter 1: that what matters in the end are 
      changes in the vocabulary rather than changes in belief, changes in truth-
      value candidates rather than assignments of truth-value ... To accept the 
     claim that there is no standpoint outside the particular historically con-
     ditioned and temporary vocabulary we are presently using from which to 
     judge this vocabulary is to give up on the idea that there can be reasons 
      for using languages as well as reasons within languages for believing state-
     ments. This amounts to giving up the idea that intellectual and political 
      progress is rational, in any sense of `rational' which is neutral between 
      vocabularies. " 62 
Now clearly, as argued by a series of scholars,63 even if we give up a naive 
62 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
   p.47 f. 
63 For instance by Roy Bhaskar in Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philoso-
    phy, London, Verso, 1989, and in Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991 and 
    by William Outhwaite in New Philosophies of Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, 
    London, Macmillan, 1988. 
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empiricist notion of the existence of a socially neutral and unaffected vocabulary, 
there is no compelling reason why this preclude arguing for the relative merits of 
different truth claims. Statements may well be compared in terms of the 
accounts they yield under their own descriptions. 
     More importantly, as argued i a by Manicas and Rosenberg64 but also by 
many others65 the very fact that intellectual activities, including those of the social 
sciences, have to be understood in terms of their social nature, is not really an 
argument for relativism but rather for a realist interpretation. If we do not posit 
the relevance of the extra-linguistic reality that scientists themselves actually claim 
to try to understand and explain, the activities of the participants become incom-
prehensible in social terms in the sense that we have to reject out of hand any in-
terpretive competence among the human beings we focus on. They would also 
be socially incomprehensible in the sense that we would voluntarily choose to be 
blind to the influence of those "virtual" social institutions and those material con-
ditions that socially influence and structure basic properties of much of what we 
contemplate, be it funding patterns, laboratory buildings, rules of employment or 
career paths. 
      Furthermore, no-one - certainly not Rorty - seems willing to deny that 
with the benefit of historical hindsight we are perfectly willing and able to pass 
exactly such judgments on the relative validity of competing accounts of reality; 
Rorty is actually even willing to venture into the realm of moral and political dis-
course in his belief in the progress of some kind of reason: "But because it seems 
pointless to say that all the great moral and intellectual advances of European his-
tory - Christianity, Galilean science, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and so 
on - were fortunate falls into temporary irrationality, the moral to be drawn is 
that the rational-irrational distinction is less useful than it once appeared ... prog-
ress, for the community as for the individual, is a matter of using new words as 
well as arguing from premises phrased in old words... " 66 
      This, however, points to something centrally important in Rorty's reason-
ing, but also in various popularized forms of "postmodernist" thought as applied 
to societal activities: a combination of extreme epistemic relativism and a quite 
complacent - almost dogmatic - conviction that all is basically well as it is: 
"M ore important, I think that contemporary liberal society already contains the
64 Peter T. Manicas and Alan Rosenberg, "Naturalism, Epistemological Individualism and the Strong 
   Programme in the Sociology of Science" and "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge", in Journal for 
   the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol.s 15 and 18 (1985 and 1988), respectively. 
65 Peter Wagner and Bjorn Wittrock, "Analyzing Social Science: On the Possibility of a Sociology of the 
    Social Sciences" and "States, Institutions, and Discourses: A Comparative Perspective on the Struc-
   turation of the Social Sciences" in op, cit., pp.3-22 and 331-357, respectively. 
66 Rorty, op, cit., p.48 f.
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institutions for its own improvement ... Indeed, my hunch is that Western social 
and political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs. " 67 
     This is all very well, and it would be something of an argument ad 
hominem to recall that many a philosopher, including one of the least liberal phi-
losophers of all of the last century, Hegel, has thought likewise about the institu-
tions of his own societies. Indeed, many a reader, tired of meters of volumes by 
the representatives of the three or four generations of critical theorists from 
Adorno and Horkheimer, with their ever-gloomier pictures of the course of 
Western societies, may welcome this Rortian exercise in anti-critical thinking. 
However, from a scholarly point of view, the relevant question does not concern 
what Rorty might "think" or what his "hunch" may be, but rather what reasons 
we are offered for accepting these "hunches." 
     All the cautious skepticism urged on us in the sphere of linguistic philoso-
phy somehow dissolves into thin air when we analyse societal and political in-
stitutions. But "hunches" cannot replace serious social science, and "beliefs" that 
developments, albeit conceptual ones, have come to their proper end cannot re-
place historically informed scholarship. And such a historically-informed, social-
scientific study cannot very well be limited to vocabulary and metaphors but also 
has to wed this analysis to one concerning the institutions that have exerted a 
very real influence on the fates of human beings now and in history. 
     Societal and political interactions are certainly linguistically mediated, at 
least potentially. Yet they are not all about talk and vocabulary but also about 
institutional resources and power. They are performed not by speech acts but by 
human beings moving in real space and time, with bodies and memories and 
hopes. A social science that chooses to neglect this simple fact may well be an 
interesting science of rhetorical figures and of the frequencies of signs in various 
more or less arbitrarily chosen vocabularies, but it then also ceases even to resem-
ble a science of society. Social science is a scholarly exercise that has always had 
to take on as the most fundamental problem the sorting out of its own accounts 
of real human beings' actions and how these are linked to the ensemble of 
regularities, institutions and structures that we choose to jointly label "a society": 
social science must, in one way or an other, come to terms with the problem of 
agency and structure. 
     Thus the deep-seated shift involved in the linguistic turn in the social and 
human sciences has stimulated an interest in the linguistic constitution of societal 
institutions and conceptual histories and language games. However, beyond the 
sphere of linguistic analysis, it has sometimes among social scientists been seen to
67 Ibid., p.63
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entail a stance that denies the very possibility of comparative historical studies. 
This is somewhat paradoxical considering the important role played by the tradi-
tion of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte). Since we are trapped, so the 
argument often goes, within the bounds of our particular language games, it is an 
illusion - or worse, an arrogance - to believe that there could be any privileged 
vantage point from which various language games could be assessed or even 
comparatively observed. 
     Thus the insights of the linguistic turn have often tended to be turned in-
ward onto themselves and to support a plea for the relative uselessness of compa-
rative and historical studies of society. It would be truly ironic if social scientists 
were to accept such an abdication at the precise point when the need for an 
understanding of the foundations of shifts in the cultural and political order of 
society would appear most urgent. 
     Precisely because of the. Eurocentric limitations of much of classical social 
science and the concomitant presupposition that somehow a European pattern of 
development will be repeated, if with lags and delays, on a universal scale, the 
need is the greater for a truly comparative analysis of developments of similar 
transformations outside the European context. 
     Were such a reorientation to occur in historically and comparatively 
oriented social science, social science would most likely become not only in-
creasingly historically informed and oriented but infinitely better placed to under-
stand its own development and that of the societies it seeks to grasp.
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